Biden disturbing information to China
During his first 100 days, President Biden generally oversaw the continuation of his predecessor, China, but he did so at the same time, transforming the US strategy into a competition for cooperation, a rift for his predecessor’s more confrontational approach. At first blushing, the differences are not obvious. Like the Trump administration, Biden’s team has called on Taiwan to “firmly” lift restrictions on contacts with Taipei diplomats amid growing support for Beijing’s increasingly aggressive military crackdown. The Biden administration also condemned the persecution of Uyghurs as genocide, crimes against humanity, and redoubled US support for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. Domestically, it maintained the major restrictions imposed on Chinese technology companies by the Trump era, and organized a virtual summit to expand the Quad group of Indo-Pacific democracies. The main difference is the trajectory of the president’s strategy. What he has done so far is encouraging. But that is the minimum required by the current political consensus on China. If the administration’s efforts to work with Beijing on climate issues are evidence, even the current tough stance against CCP violations could be mitigated in the future. Anything that strongly condemns the direct attack of the Chinese party-state on any democracy, international order or human rights is less than the problem needed to meet the challenge. So what should the Biden administration say about China? Officials should imitate the rhetoric of their predecessors. Trump officials described the party as “a Marxist-Leninist regime that has long exercised power over the Chinese people through brainwashing and brute force,” thinking they would be “encouraged to do for a free world, not a distant future.” Although Biden and his advisers have spoken strongly about Beijing’s aspirations to seize democracy around the world, they have been more careful in discussing the threat. The president’s joint address to Congress on Wednesday shows a descriptive case. First, his emphasis on “middle-class foreign policy” overshadowed the need to cover potential initiatives that otherwise supported his administration. He could have used his address to respond to his previous calls for full funding of the Peacekeeping Initiative ելու to pass two major legislative packages currently under way through Congress that would enhance America’s ability to compete with the CCP. Instead, he turned to competition with China to justify his domestic political agenda. “The investments I make are driven by a foreign policy that I think benefits the middle class,” he said of the $ 1 trillion program for American families. Biden then cited his discussions with CCP Secretary-General Xi Jinping to explain how his administration is approaching US-China competition. He discussed the importance of protecting human rights, but did not mention the sick democracy movement in Hong Kong or the Uyghur genocide. He is committed to a “strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific region”, but failed to use the moment to warn the Party of its plans for Taiwan. Taking into account all the things, Biden’s approach to China so far was summarized in the address. Better than the Trump years before the threat of America waking up, but still not enough to advance the ball. At the same time, since the beginning of Biden’s presidency, the administration has stated that the rivalry may be accompanied by a bid for cooperation with the Chinese regime, despite the recognition by the Biden administration that China is committing mass atrocities and preparing to attack Taiwan. Already, US climate envoy John Kerry met with his Chinese counterpart in Shanghai, where he issued a joint statement promising some modest commitments to finance clean energy transitions in developing countries. The problem with the approach of the administration is twofold. Although China is interested in reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions in the long run, there is no reason to believe that it would do so at a pace dictated by negotiations with Washington. Worse, Chinese officials are conditioning their participation in a future deal on US policy toward Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang. “If the United States no longer interferes in China’s internal affairs, we can work more smoothly on climate change,” said Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council last week, reiterating the party’s position. Kerry insists he will not let those other issues remain a “hostage” to the climate, but he nevertheless considers the talks imperative. However, those negotiations have already shaped how he speaks about US-China relations. He did not say anything about human rights in Shanghai. And in an interview with Foreign Policy this week, he said that while the two countries have their differences, “those differences should not be hindered by things that are as important as dealing with the climate.” He added that his conversation in Shanghai was tough, but that they managed to find some common language. Future progress is unlikely to remain. By 2020, China will account for three-quarters of the world’s new coal plants. And Kerry mistakenly assumes that Beijing considers it in its interest to make progress “in those other areas,” when in fact the Chinese Communist Party has proved that it wants to deepen its authoritarianism at home and pursue a racist policy abroad. The highlight of this was the administration’s emphasis on working with US allies, increasing Washington’s ability to respond to the CCP’s malicious behavior. Although the Trump administration relied on US alliances more than many people realized, that diplomacy was often overshadowed by President Trump’s rhetoric. Although top administration officials mistakenly allowed the US-China summit to allow CCP diplomats to lie about Beijing’s human rights abuses and America’s role in the world, they deserve commendation for doing so only after traveling to Secretary of State Anthony Japan. այում In South Korea. The Biden administration’s early communication with Europe also seems to have paved the way for greater transatlantic unity with China, despite the German government’s commercial interests in Beijing. Blinken’s first foreign trip, Brussels, became the site of a massive, systematic campaign in which the EU, Britain, and Canada joined the United States in imposing sanctions on Chinese officials involved in the Uyghur genocide. On its own terms, it makes sense to make such an international effort. Even better, it prompted Beijing to impose sanctions on European researchers, activists and politicians. Previously, the Comprehensive Investment Agreement, an EU-China trade deal that merely addressed human rights issues, had a fair chance of being approved by the European Parliament despite US objections. The CCP’s heavy response seems to have somewhat obscured those prospects. But building an alliance in the administration’s arsenal is just one tool; it alone cannot mitigate the vulnerabilities that have been uncovered by the administration through the early circumvention of the PKK. As long as the president does not back down from his troubling efforts to seek cooperation with the Party, unless he vaguely describes the threat to human freedom, he risks undermining some other promising policies he has taken to address the challenge in his first 100 days.